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APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT IN REPLY
I.

Neither Principles of Recoupment Nor Other Principles
of Equity
Create a Defense Against
or Excuse
Respondents1 Non-Performance of Their Obligations Under
the Note,
A.

Respondents Were Not Entitled Under the Note to
Offset Their Note Payments With Unliquidated
Damage Claims Relating to the Post Office Roof.

Respondents apparently accept the rule enunciated in
Canton Hardware Co, v. Haller, 53 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio 1944)
that acceleration is proper under the circumstances of this
case if the respondents proved offsets against their note
payments in an amount less than the accrued
owing

under

the promissory

note.

installments

As has been shown in

Stacey's opening brief, if the damages awarded regarding the
post office roof are not

"offset" against past due note

payments, then the offsets proven by respondents under the
note are insufficient to prevent acceleration.
determinative
respondents
"offset"

issue

relating

against

preventing

is whether

to the post

their

acceleration

recouped against

the

past
or

judgment

office

due

awarded

to

should

be

installments

rather, as

the accelerated

roof

Thus, the

Stacey

thereby
contends,

balance owing under the

note.
That

issue is not determined by an analysis of the

distinction

between

"recoupment"

and

"setoff"

found

at

common lawf but by the agreement of the parties set forth in
the note.

The agreement is clear.

The only condition under

which respondents could avoid making their required payments
to

Stacey

was

by

their
by

offsetting

them

which

those
were

payments

with

expenses

incurred

reimbursable

by

Stacey.

Plainly, unliquidated claims for damages did not

constitute a basis for non-payment in that such claims were
not supported by any reimbursable expenses and therefore did
not fulfill the condition precedent required in the note for
the assertion of an "offset."

As has been stated, both

Judge Roth and respondents1 own counsel recognized that such
was the proper interpretation of the offset provision in the
note.1

•'-Respondents now attempt to recant their arguments
made at trial concerning the meaning of the offset language
in the note by arguing that those arguments were made "out
of context."
(Brief of Respondent, at p. 15, n. 11). To
the contrary, those arguments were directly related to the
interpretation of the offset provision.
Mr. Waddoups,
counsel
for
respondents,
in
regard
to respondents1
unliquidated damage claims argued to the Court as follows:
Mr. Waddoups: The [roof] issue is not
really an offset item. It is a damage claim,
since no expenses have been incurred by the
Golers, but we have reasonably proven that
[Stacey] has failed to meet the contract
obligation that we have been damaged in the
fact that we have not got a water-tight roof
. . . . (TR-472). . . . [L]et me say with
respect to the sidewalk issue again, that is
not really an offset item, but a breach of
warranty, breach of contract item
. . . .
(TR-474).
Whereupon the following exchanges occurred:
Mr Anderson (counsel for Stacey): They
(respondents) have admitted [the roof] is not
-2 -

As they did at trial, respondents attempt to pound a
square peg through a round hole in arguing at length that
section 17 of the letter agreement allows them the right to
offset their unliquidated damage claims against past due
installment payments.
expressly

labeled

Section 17 of the letter agreement is
"Idemnity"

and

requires

an offset item.
It should not be offset
against the note." (TR-476).

The Court:
Before ruling on the
motions, I need a little bit of help. Mr.
Waddoups, in your argument you suggested that
your claim for damage to the roof was not in
the form of an offset. I guess that took me
by surprise.
I have been considering all
through the case that was your claim, that
was part of the offset.
I was looking at
that issue the same as the others.
Mr. Waddoups: I believe it is actually
pled in the alternative as a damage item or
as an offset. I had difficulty dealing with
it, knowing how to deal with it as an offset
item, since there has not been actually an
outlay of cash. I think the most proper way
is evidence
of damage
for
breach of
contract. Both ways were pleaded.
The Court:
The same reasoning then
apply [sic] to the sidewalk, since there was
no outlay of cash, there was no offset?
Mr. Waddoups:

I believe —

(TR-477).

The Court: [Y]ou agreed the sidewalk is
not a setoff item, neither is the roof, for
purposes of being offset against the note . .
. . (TR-582, lines 21-23).
- 3-

Stacey

to

"indemnify, defend and hold [respondents] harmless" against
a variety of expenses or damages sustained by respondents as
a result of Stacey's failure to comply with the requirements
of the letter agreement.
In response to respondents' argument concerning section
17 at the conclusion of trial, Judge Roth properly concluded
that

section

17

was

intended

to

relate

to

Stacey's

indemnification of respondents against expenses or damages
incurred

by

them

as

a

parties;

to the extent

result
that

of

the actions

respondents

of

incurred

third
actual

expenses or sustained damages from such claims, they could
offset their installment payments in those amounts, if they
were properly reimbursable by Stacey.

(See Transcript of

Post-Trial Hearing of July 11, 1986 at p. 21).
Aside

from

there never

having been any third party

claims against respondents to trigger section 17, it should
be emphasized

again

that

respondents

simply

incurred no

expenses whatsoever regarding the roof which could be offset
under

the

payments.

terms

of

Again,

the
as

note
the

against

their

installment

district

court

concluded,

"[b]ecause defendants had incurred no out of pocket expenses
with respect to [the post office roof] prior to trial, no
offset against

the note arose under paragraph 17 of the

Agreement and the Note."

(Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law

Therefore, respondents

at

1113(c)(4)).

- 4-

arguments

concerning section 17 only serve to confuse the issues and
do not expand their right to offset to include claims for
which they never incurred any reimbursable expenses.
B.
Equity Requires That Respondents Recoup Their Roof
Damages Against the Accelerated Balance Owing, Rather Than
Applying Those Damages So As To Prevent Acceleration.
Stacey does not dispute that, as a matter of equity,
respondents should be allowed to recoup the amount of their
judgment relating to the post office roof against amounts
owing by them to Stacey under the note.
of

equity

similarly

dictate

However, principles

respondents1

that

right

of

recoupment be exercised against the accelerated principle
balance owing, rather than against respondents1 defaulted
note payments so as to prevent acceleration.
A

right

of

recoupment, being

an

equitable

remedy,

should not be exercised in such a way as to work an unfair
prejudice to one of the parties.

See, e.g., Freston v. Gulf

Oil Co., 565 P.2d 787, 788 (Utah 1977) (in the absence of a
showing

of

prejudice,

equity

requires

a

right

of

recoupment); W.J. Kroeger Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.,
541 P.2d 385, 388 (Az. 1975) (recoupment is an equitable
doctrine); 20 Am. Jur. 2d, Counterclaim, Recoupment & Setoff, §25 (1965) (equitable set off will not be allowed where
it will work an injustice).
Although respondents wish to dismiss the importance of
the technical language of the note, that language provided

- 5-

Stacey with important

substantive protections against the

respondents1 abuse of offset rights.
created

a

built

respondents1

in

control

Namely, that language

mechanism

against

arbitrary or groundless assertion

the

of offset

rights for items that did not truly require a remedy, or for
items which were not Staceyfs responsibility.

Under the

note, respondents could not avoid their payment obligations
by merely raising "concerns" about perceived deficiencies
with

the properties;

rather,

their

right

to offset

was

firmly rooted in commercial reality in that it required as
condition precedents

that

(1) they incur an expense for

which they were entitled to a reimbursement from Stacey and
(2) they give Stacey notice of the amount of the claimed
offset and the "specific reasons therefore."
In light of the offset provision contained in the note
to which respondents agreed, and upon which Stacey relied,
respondents

should

now

be

estopped

from

attempting

to

enlarge the nature of their offset right to include claims
for unliquidated damages.
(a party

may

be

estopped

See 20 Am. Jur. 2d, supra at 250
from,

or waive

its

right

to

equitable setoff through its agreement).
In addition to running contrary to the agreement of the
parties to the detriment of Stacey, respondents can point to
no

counterveiling

reason

in

equity

why

they

should

be

entitled to apply their roof judgment against defaulted note

payments, rather than recouping that judgment against the
accelerated principal balance owing.

Like other equitable

remedies, the exercise of a right to recoupment is often
justified

on

the

grounds

that

the

party

recoupment had no adequate legal remedy.
Jur. 2d supra at 246.

seeking

the

See, e.g.y 20 Am.

That clearly is not the case in this

matter in that respondents at all times had the option of
bringing a breach of warranty action against Stacey relating
to its unliquidated claims for damages and in fact actually
obtained

an

enforceable

pursuant

to

their

judgment

counterclaims

relating
raised

in

to

the

this

roof

action.

Additionally, the avoidance of "circuity of actions" in no
way militates towards respondents' being allowed to recoup
their judgment against past due installments, rather than
against the accelerated balance owing.
Finally, respondents' argument that Stacey should not
in equity be entitled to demand "full performance under the
Note while at the same time refusing to perform fully its
obligations under the agreement" simply mischaracterizes the
relief requested by Stacey.

Plainly, Stacey is not seeking

full payment of the promissory note.

Stacey concedes that

respondents proved their right to offset their note payments
in the amount of $8,112.94; Stacey does not contend that
respondents are entitled to recover the legitimate offsets
proven

by

them.

Additionally,
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Stacey

concedes

that

respondents are entitled to recoup their judgment relating
to the post office roof against the accelerated amount owing
under the note; Stacey does not seek to recover that amount
from respondents.*
Rather, Stacey now seeks to recover only that to which
it proved it is entitled - the accelerated balance of the
note remaining after the above-described adjustments.
deny

Stacey

that

relief

would

be

to

repudiate

To

entirely

Staceyfs right of acceleration and to sanction respondents'
continuous and blatant disregard of their own obligations
under the note.
C.
There Are No Equitable Considerations Present in This
Case Requiring That the Right of Acceleration be Established
at a Time Other Than the Time of Trial.
As argued in some detail in Staceyfs opening brief, the
proper time to determine the right to acceleration is at
trial.
an

Judge Roth was troubled that this rule might create

injustice

due

to

the

"uncertainties

associated with bringing a case to trial.
well taken.

and

delays"

That point is

Howeverf Stacey submits that in the absence of

a showing that it somehow procured a delay of the trial, or
otherwise unfairly obtained an advantage due to that delay,

Stacey does, however, question the appropriateness
of the amounts awarded regarding the roof, as well as the
offset allowed regarding the post office air conditioning
unit. See Brief of Cross-Respondents.

there is no reason not to determine the acceleration right
according to the better rule, at the time of trial.
In no way can it be said that Stacey procured a delay
of the trial in order to build up defaulted installment
payments.

It should be remembered

that Stacey was not

receiving any payment under the note and it had no prospect
of changing that scenario short of a trial.

From Stacey1s

perspective, there was no advantage whatsoever associated
with delay; all of Staceyfs actions as shown in the record
are consistent with seeking a prompt adjudication.

For

example, Stacey filed its Complaint on December 3, 1984,
promptly conducted discovery and filed a Certification of
Readiness

for

Trial

on

August

2,

1985.

(R-232).

Importantly, rather than Stacey procuring any delay, it was
respondents

who

desired

delay

as

evidenced

by

their

Objection to Staceyfs Certification of Readiness for Trial
filed on August 9, 1985.

(R-242).

Similarly, it was respondents who took advantage of the
"delays associated with bringing the case to trial."

This

is perhaps no better illustrated than by respondents1 claims
regarding
offset

the post office

their

payments

roof.

regarding

Respondents
the

estimated

sought

to

cost

of

replacing the roof in the spring of 1985 after the roof had
sprung several leaks.

See Exhibit D-7.

However, Stacey

responded to the problem and fixed the leaks (see Exhibit
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D-7);

as

respondent

Francine

Wixen

testified

deposition in California on September

at

her

19f 1985, the roof

remained "water tight" after those repairs.

(Deposition of

Francine Wixen at p. 85).
This matter was originally

set to be tried shortly

after Wixen's deposition on October 24, 1985,2 rather than
in May of 1986.

If the trial had proceeded in October,

respondents would have had scant evidence to support their
claims

that

the

roof

needed

replacing

since

Stacey

had

repaired the spring leaks and the roof was "water tight."
Indeed,

the roof expert

ultimately utilized at trial by

respondents had not even been retained by them prior to the
October trial date (TR-262).
However, the trial was delayed until May of 1986 to
accommodate the Court and the respondents' schedule.

In the

spring of 1986, the roof sustained several acute leaks that
were

not

quickly

or

easily

repaired

by

Stacey,

thereby

bolstering significantly respondents' claim that the roof
needed to be replaced.

(See Exhibit D-7). A review of the

post office maintenance log illustrates that the spring of
1986 was by far the most leaky period for the roof.
Exhibit

D-7).

(See

Based on those spring leaks, respondents

^The court's notification of the October 24, 1985
trial setting is inexplicably absent from the record in this
case.
However, that trial setting cannot be disputed by
respondents.
- 10 (

retained a roof expert in April of 1986 who testified at the
trial that the roof needed to be replaced. (TR-262).

Thusf

respondents can hardly claim that Stacey obtained an unfair
advantage through the "uncertainties and delays" of bringing
this case to trial.
II.

Staceyfs Right to Attorneys1 Fees and Costs Is Not
Dependent Upon Its Prevailing on the Acceleration
Issue.

A.
The Promissory Note Expressly Requires the Award
of Attorneys1 Fees, Costs and Expenses Associated With
Staceyfs Enforcement of Any of Its Rights Under the Note.
The parties agree that Stacey1s right to recover its
attorneys1

feesf

costs and expenses is premised upon the

agreement of the parties.

That agreement expressly granted

Stacey the following rights:

(1) the right to repayment of

the principal of $80f000 plus interest at 10.5%; (2) the
right to receive installment payments of $731.39; and (3)
the

right

to accelerate

the principal

balance owing

respondents breached the provisions of the note.

if

As has

been noted, Stacey was entitled to recover its fees, costs
and

expenses

incurred

"by

or

in

connection

with

the

enforcement or performance of any of [its] rights under the
note."
This lawsuit would have been an extraordinarily simple
matter

if it involved only Stacey1s presentation of its

claims for acceleration.

In such a case, Stacey would have

been required only to prove respondents1 default, Stacey1s

- 11 -

right

to acceleration

and

the accelerated

amount

owing.

Instead, respondents transformed the case into a complicated
"construction

defects"

case

by

asserting

a

myriad

of

complaints about the properties and their right to offset
their note payments because of the problems.
Regardless of its right
obviously

forced

to acceleration, Stacey was

to prepare

defenses

to each

and

every

offset asserted by respondents if it hoped to receive any
payment under the note.

If Stacey's expenses associated

with preparing those defenses were not incurred "by or in
connection with the enforcement of [Stacey1s] rights" under
the note, then one wonders for whose benefit and for what
purpose those considerable expenses were incurred.
Respondents attempt to ignore the practical realities
of

Staceyfs

predicament

by

arguing

myopically

that

(1)

Stacey was seeking only to enforce its right of acceleration
under the note; and (2) Stacey did not "enforce" any of its
rights because respondents were never in default of their
obligations.

With all due respect, those arguments are

hogwash.
Stacey was plainly fighting for its life to receive
some payment under the note, regardless of acceleration, as
respondents

had

"offset"

the

note

Secondly, respondents were obviously
obligations

under

the

note.

Even

out

of

existence.

in default of their
though

Judge

Roth

- 12 (

concluded
entitled

that,

on

equitable

to accelerate

grounds,

Stacey

was

not

the note, he also concluded that

respondents were only entitled to offset their installments
in the amount of $8,112.943 —

a full $74,966.37 less than

the amount they attempted to offset.

According to Judge

Roth's adjudication, respondents were in default of their
payment obligations as of June 1, 1985, the point in time
when

respondents1

exhausted.

$8,112.94

in

legitimate

offsets

were

(See Exhibit E to Appellant Stacey Properties

Opening Brief).
Contrary to respondents1 argument, Stacey does not in
any way contend that it is entitled to its fees and costs
based upon a "prevailing party" theory.
never been advanced by Stacey.

That theory has

Rather, Stacey*s entitlement

to its fees and costs is based solely on the agreement of
the parties.
In direct opposition to respondents1 argument, Traynor
v. Cushing, 688 P.2d

856 (Utah 1984) supports precisely

Stacey1 s theory

it

that

is entitled

J

to a share of its

Again, Judge Roth concluded and respondents agreed
at trial that respondents were not properly entitled under
the note to offset their payments with the unliquidated
damage claims related to the post office roof. Even if this
Court concludes that Judge Roth erred in this regard, Stacey
nonetheless enforced its right to payment under the note in
the amount of $67,249.83 plus interest, which was a
substantial "enforcement of rights" under any standard.

- 13 -

attorneys fees and costs in proportion to its success.
Traynorf
the

as respondents have notedf

impropriety

"prevailing

of

party"

awarding
theory

agreement of the parties.4

this Court recognized

attorneys

without

In

any

fees

based

reference

on a
to

the

That principle, however, does

not mean, as respondents seem to argue, that the "prevailing
party"

cannot

recover

a portion

of

its fees and

costs

pursuant to an agreementf to the extent that it "prevailed"
in vindicating some but not all of its rights.

As this

Court noted in Traynor:
Each of these parties had rights under
the agreement that were denied him by the
other.
Each was required to take legal
action to enforce the agreement in one or
more particulars. Each was successful on one
or more points and unsuccessful on others.
Each was therefore entitled to an award of
attorneys* fees for successfully enforcing
the agreement against the other.
Id. at 858.
The Traynor court went on to hold that the district
court

erred

respective

in failing
parties

in

to award
proportion

fees and costs
to

their

to the

successful

assertion of rights under the agreement.

4

Judge Roth engaged in precisely this error when he
rejected Stacey1s right to fees without even hearing
argument on the grounds that Stacey had not "prevailed" on
the acceleration issue and was therefore not entitled to any
of its fees and costs. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at 1120) .

- 14 <

Unlike the agreement in Traynory the attorneys' fees
provision in the subject note does not provide for the award
of fees and costs to either party enforcing its provisions,
but only to Stacey.5

Therefore, Stacey alone is entitled to

recover its fees and costs in proportion to its success in
the manner described in Stacey's opening brief at pp. 30-31.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and in its opening
brief, Stacey

requests

the

relief

requested

in Stacey's

opening brief.
DATED:

April

3 ^

, 1987.

HANSEN & ANDERSON

LA^yt^~^<>^~>>
William P. Schwartz
50 West Broadway, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellant and
Cross Respondent

5

While the Utah legislature has recently created a
"reciprocal right" to fees and costs in actions involving a
one-sided fee provision, that law by its terms only effects
contracts executed after April 28, 1986 and is therefore
inapplicable to this case. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5.
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